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Welfare Implications of Selected Supply and Demand  





An equilibrium displacement model is developed and used to estimate the welfare impacts of 
government and industry-funded promotion programs, country of origin labeling (COOL), and 
the disease-driven, international bans on U.S. beef. The model goes beyond past studies by 
including the U.S. domestic market and both U.S. meat imports and exports, with meats 
differentiated by source of origin. The results indicate that while the benefits from beef and pork 
promotions are higher, the negative impacts of COOL are lower in a model with international 
trade than in a model without trade. International bans on U.S. beef decrease the welfare of 
producers and marketers of U.S. beef. 
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Introduction 
 
The effects of various supply and demand shocks on U.S. meat prices, quantities, and industry 
welfare have been widely studied (Mullen, Wohlgenant, and Farris 1988; Unnevehr, Gomez, and 
Garcia 1998; Chung and Kaiser 1999; Wohlgenant 1993; Kinnucan, Xiao, and Hsia 1996; 
Brester, Marsh, and Atwood 2004; Lusk and Anderson 2004; and Lusk and Norwood 2005). 
However, one notable deficiency among past studies is that meats were not differentiated by 
source of origin, and the U.S. international trade was typically not included. In most of these past 
studies, imported meats were ignored. If included, these meats were not differentiated by source 
of origin, and U.S. meat export markets were not considered. As a result, none of these previous 
models could evaluate the effects of the U.S. non-price export promotion programs and trade 
barriers such as meat bans on U.S. meat producers and marketers. 
Although non-source differentiation might have been a realistic assumption in the past, 
this assumption no longer applies to the highly segregated world meat market. The world meat 
market has been divided into disease-restricted and disease-free countries primarily due to 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), and avian influenza 
(AI). For example Japan and South Korea banned U.S. beef after the discovery of BSE in the 
U.S. in 2003. Therefore, source differentiating meats according to the supply source when 
estimating the impact of various supply and demand shocks on the U.S. and other countries’ 
meat industries has become increasingly important. 
Policy makers, producers, and consumers are interested in knowing the impacts of 
economic and non-economic variables on meat markets across the globe. This study provides a 
modeling framework and analyzes the economic impacts of selected, non-economic variables on 
producers and marketers of U.S. meats. An equilibrium displacement model is developed and   3 
used to estimate the impacts of non-economic variables (recent shocks and policy variables) on 
producers and marketers of U.S. meats. The non-economic variables whose impacts are studied 
here include government and industry-funded domestic and export promotion programs (beef 
and pork promotions), country of origin labeling (COOL), and animal disease-driven 
international bans on U.S. beef (ban of U.S. beef in Japan and South Korea). 
The reminder of this study is organized as follows: the next section develops and 
describes the equilibrium displacement model. This section is followed by a description of the 
model parameters and a discussion of simulation methods and welfare measures of supply and 
demand shocks due to: (1) beef and pork promotions, (2) COOL; and (3) the Japanese and South 
Korean bans on U.S. beef. The simulated results and summary and conclusions are presented in 
the last two sections, respectively. 
Equilibrium Displacement Model 
An equilibrium displacement model is used to estimate welfare impacts of beef and pork 
promotions, COOL, and the Japanese and South Korean bans on U.S. beef. The structural 
specification of supply and demand relationships of meats (beef, pork, and poultry) provides the 
framework for the equilibrium displacement model (Wohlgenant 1993). This model includes 
U.S. domestically produced meats and U.S. meat imports from major countries [Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the rest-of-the world (ROW)] plus U.S. meat exports to major 
countries (Canada, Japan, Mexico, and South Korea). Furthermore, the meat model specified 
here includes two distinct sectors: “retail” (consumer) and “farm” (producer). In addition, on the 
retail demand side, the model considers relationships (substitution and complementary 
relationships) between U.S. produced meats and meats from other supply sources in the U.S. 
domestic and export markets.   4 
The food industry has become more concentrated and imperfectly competitive. For 
example, the four-firm concentration ratio in the U.S. beef packing industry increased from 0.30 
in 1978 to 0.86 in 1994, and statistically significant monopoly/monopsony price distortions in 
slaughter cattle and wholesale beef markets have been reported (Sexton 2000; and Schroeter 
1988). Therefore, although most equilibrium displacement models have assumed perfect 
competition as a base meat market structure assumption, the equilibrium displacement model 
developed in this study can assume either perfect or imperfect competition of the middle stage 
(processor-retailer) of the meat supply chain. 
The equilibrium displacement model is based on certain theoretical assumptions (Brester 
and Wohlgenant 1997; and Wohlgenant 1993). For this study, these assumptions include:  
(a) the linearity of all supply and demand curves; and (b) the fact that any shifts in supply and 
demand curves are parallel. Chung and Kaiser (1999) report that the type of supply and demand 
shifts (parallel and pivotal) assumed is important when analyzing the effectiveness of two or 
more different policies on producers and consumers’ welfare. However, the resulting outcome 
[gains or loses] does not vary with the type of shift assumed. Hence, given that this study does 
not compare the effectiveness of different policies on producers’ and consumers’ welfare, a 
parallel shift appears to be a reasonable assumption.; (c) fixed proportion production technology 
at the processors-retailers’ market level. Fixed proportion technology means that the elasticity of 
substitution between market inputs and farm product at the processors-retailers’ market level is 
zero; and (d) that substitution and complementary relationships are modeled on the demand side 
but not on the supply side. The model does not allow for production relationships (substitutes 
and complements) among the included meats because it assumes that specialized inputs and   5 
different production technologies are used in each meat type production. MacDonald et al. 
(1996) report that the meat industry has a high degree of specialization in production. 
Following these assumptions, the equilibrium displacement model is presented below. 
The meat demand equation with its shifter is presented as: 
(1)    ik
d*
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where 
* d
ijk Q is the percentage of change in the quantity of meat of type i from country j demanded 
in country k. The subscript i denotes meat type and i =1,K, I. The subscript j denotes the country 
of origin of meat type i, (the supply source of meat of type i demanded in country k and j =1, 
2,K, J). The source differentiated meat of type i is called a meat product. The subscript k 
denotes the consuming country (countries in which meat i from country j is demanded). The k 
destinations are (1) the U.S., (2) Canada, (3) Japan, (4) Mexico, and (5) South Korea. 
* d
k P  is the 
percentage of change in a vector of demand prices for source differentiated meats in country k, 
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represents a vector of own-price and cross-price demand elasticities for meats demanded in 
country k, and  ik ϖ  is a vector of demand shifters of meat i demanded in country k, 
The meat supply equation with its shifter is presented as: 




ij P Q γ ε ε + =
* *  
where 
* s
ij Q  is the percentage of change in the quantity of meat of type i supplied from country j. 
The j suppliers are the U.S., Canada, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, Brazil, Australia, New 
Zealand, Denmark, China, Thailand, and the ROW. Note that the j suppliers vary across the k 
destinations. 
* s
ij P is the percentage of change in the  supply price of meat of type i from country j   6 
(product ij);  ij ε  is the own-price supply elasticity of meat i from country j, and ij γ  is the supply 
shifter of meat i from country j. 
The market-clearing conditions are given by the respective quantity and price equilibrium 
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where 
* d
ijj Q  is the percentage of change in the quantity of meat i from country j that is demanded 
in the supplying country j (from its own source domestically produced), 
* d
ijk Q  is the percentage of 
change in the quantity of meat i from country j that is demanded in country k (exported by 
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of meat i from country j that is demanded in the supplying country j (
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supplied of meat i from country j (
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ijk ijk Q Q / = λ , and it is the ratio between the quantity of 
meat i from country j that is demanded in the importing country k (
d
ijk Q ) and the quantity of meat 
i supplied from country j (
s
ij Q ); and the other variables are as previously defined. 
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ijk Q is the percentage of change in the quantity of meat of type i supplied from country j to the 
consuming country k. The percentage of change in the quantity supplied,
* s
ijk Q , and the quantity 
demanded, 
* d
ijk Q , corresponds to the domestically produced meats and foreign produced meats 
when  k j =  and k j ≠ , respectively.   7 
Given the farm supply and retail demand equations, the retail demand and farm supply 
equations can be linked with retail-farm price equations to ensure equilibrium across the two 
vertical channels. Following Sexton (2000), and Sexton and Zhang (2001), the retail-farm price 
linkage equations when allowing for imperfect competition at the middle stage (processors-
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where 
* d
ijk P  is the percentage of change in the price of meat i from country j demanded in country 
k,  ijk η  is the own-price demand elasticity of meat i from country j demanded in country k,  ij ε  is 
the own-price supply elasticity of meat i supplied from country j, ξ  and θ  are market conduct 
parameters (conjectural elasticities), which measure the extent of retailer marketing power. ξ  
measures the departure from competition in selling the finished product at the retail level, with 
0 = ξ  denoting perfect competition (the retailers do not have market power in selling the 
finished product),  1 = ξ  denoting pure monopoly, and  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ ξ denoting various degrees of 
oligopoly market power, where high values denote greater departure from competition, 
θ measures retailers’ departures from competition in buying the farm product, with  0 = θ  
denoting perfect competition (the retailers do not have market power in buying the farm 
product),  1 = θ  denoting pure monopsony, and  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ θ denoting various degrees of oligopsony 
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is the ratio between the supply price of meat i from country j and the demand price of meat i 
from country j demanded in country k, and the other variables are as previously defined. 
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Parameters Used in the Model 
The parameter values assigned to the model are: own-price and cross-price demand elasticities 
(η), own-price supply elasticities (ε ), quantity proportions (τ  ) and (λ ), price proportions (δ ), 
and the market conduct parameters, [conjectural elasticities, (ξ  and θ  )]. The own-price and 
cross-price demand elasticities (η) were estimated using a restricted source differentiated almost 
ideal demand system (RSDAIDS). The estimated demand elasticities reflect conditional 
elasticities since the RSDAIDS model is a complete demand system, which assumes weak 
separability between meats and other goods. Therefore, the estimated demand elasticities were 
converted into unconditional demand elasticities (Edgerton 1997; and Fan, Wailes, and Cramer 
1995). 
Rather than attempting to estimate the own-price supply elasticities (ε ) for meats 
supplied from different sources, this study relies on pre-existing estimates of own-price supply 
elasticities reported in the literature (Lusk and Anderson 2004; Wohlgenant 1993; and others). 
This approach is taken because the literature has credible estimates of own-price supply 
elasticities for the meat-supplying countries considered in this study. The quantity proportions 
(τ  ) and (λ ) and the price proportions (δ ) were calculated using the respective 2002 quantities 
and prices. To save space, the parameter values assigned to the model are not presented here; 
however, they can be obtained from the authors upon request. Following Zhang (2005), this 
study uses the value of 0.03 as retailer oligopsony market power (θ ). 
Simulation Methods and Welfare Measures  
Once the parameters needed in the demand and supply equations (1) and (2), and in the 
equilibrium conditions equations (3) through (5) are assigned, the values of variables with   9 
asterisks can be calculated by solving the equations simultaneously. In matrix notation, equations 
(1-5) can be written as: 
(6)    B Y A = ×  
where A is a vector of parameters of endogenous variables in equations (1-5), Y is a vector of 
changes in endogenous variables, andBis a vector of the parameter of exogenous shifters. In this 
study, equation (6) is a matrix of 164×164. Relative changes in endogenous variables Y caused 
by relative changes in exogenous supply and demand shifters are calculated by solving equation 
(7). 
(7)    B A Y × =
−1  
The model was simulated in Excel. An equivalent model was also written in SAS 
software and used to verify the accuracy of the Excel simulation. Once the values of Y have been 
determined by solving equation (7), the changes in producer surplus can be calculated. Changes 
in producer surplus at farm and retail levels in the case of parallel shifts are calculated from 
Wohlgenant (1993) (equation 10, p. 645) as follows: 








ij ij Q P Q P PS + + =   γ  (producer surplus at farm level) 








ijk ijk Q P Q P PS + + =   ν  (producer surplus at retail level) 
where  ij PS    is the change in farm producer surplus of meat i from country j,  ijk PS   is the 
change in retail producer surplus of meat i from country j demanded in country k, and the other 
variables are as previously defined. 
Methods of Simulating Beef and Pork Promotions 
 
The model described above is used to simulate the welfare impact of beef and pork promotions. 
The model is simulated by simultaneously shifting the supply and demand curves for U.S. beef 
and pork using 2002 average prices and quantities, and assuming perfect competition and retailer   10 
oligopsony market power. U.S. beef and pork supply curves are shifted to the left because in 
order to finance beef and pork promotions, U.S. beef and pork farmers have to pay additional 
costs through beef and pork check-off programs. To translate these costs into the percentage cost 
shifts (γ ) required in the model, revenues from mandatory assessment under beef and pork 
check-off programs are divided by the respective total farm revenues for each industry (Lusk and 
Anderson 2004). In 2002, beef and pork check-off programs generated $35.7 million and $27.4 
million respectively (USDA-ERS 2005). In the same period, the total farm revenues for cattle 
and hogs were $17,437 million and $6,860 million, respectively. Dividing the mandatory 
assessment of each check-off program by its respective farm revenue shows that in 2002, 
promotion increased farm production costs by 0.2% and 0.4% in the beef and pork industries, 
respectively. Therefore, shocks on U.S. beef and pork farm supply are induced by entering the 
corresponding shifters ( % 2 . 0 = γ  for beef and  % 4 . 0 = γ  for pork) in the farm supply equation 
[equation (2)]. The farm supply shifters are entered as negative numbers to represent added costs 
to the system. 
On the demand side, the estimated demand shifter parameters of impact of generic 
advertising on beef and pork demands are mixed. Some studies find the parameters to be positive 
and statistically significant (Ward and Lambert 1993) while others find the parameters to be 
insignificant and fragile (Brester and Schroeder 1995; and Kinnucan et al 1997). Studies that 
have estimated the welfare impacts of beef and pork promotions have used demand shifter 
parameters that range from 0.05% to 5.7% for beef (Kinnucan 2003; and Wohlgenant 1993) and 
from 0% to 4.5% for pork (Kinnucan, Xiao, and Hsia 1996; and Wohlgenant 1993). With this 
data in mind, the higher estimates used by Wohlgenant (1993) are used here so that our results 
can be comparable to his. Therefore, shocks on demand for U.S. beef and pork are induced by   11 
entering the corresponding shifters ( % 7 . 5 = w for beef and  % 5 . 4 = w for pork) in the retail 
demand equation [equation (1)]. The demand shifters are entered as a positive number to 
represent consumer willingness to pay for the initial quantity of meat due to promotion. 
Methods of Simulating the Welfare Impacts of COOL 
 
The model described above is also used to simulate the welfare impacts of COOL. The additional 
parameters needed to estimate welfare impacts of COOL are supply and demand shifters. Supply 
shifters reflect a decrease in the beef and pork supply due to implementation of COOL while 
demand shifters reflect an increase in the demand for U.S. beef and pork after implementing 
COOL. 
Regarding farm supply shifters, the assumption is that COOL costs are borne by U.S. 
beef and pork producers and foreign producers bear none of the costs associated with COOL. 
Implementation of COOL is reported to decrease the farm supply of U.S. beef within a range 
from 0.5% to 6.5% and the farm supply of U.S. pork within a range from 0.25% to 3% (Lusk and 
Anderson 2004). In this study, we use the medium values of 3% and 1% reported by Lusk and 
Anderson (2004) as farm supply shifters of U.S. beef and pork, respectively. Using the 2002 
average farm revenues for beef and pork, 3% and 1%, decreases in farm supply for beef and pork 
correspond to total COOL costs of $17,436.9 million for beef and $68.8 million for pork. These 
costs fall within the range of COOL costs estimated by VanSickle et al. (2003) and Sparks 
Companies, Inc (2003). 
The supply shifters at the retail level are computed by dividing the COOL costs reported 
above by the respective retail revenues. Using this method, retail supply shifters for beef and 
pork are 1.73% and 0.36%, respectively. Each meat product that is marketed in the U.S. bears a 
cost proportional to its aggregate share of the market. Table 1 presents the supply shifters of each   12 
meat product under the examined possibilities of cost incidence. Four alternatives are examined 
for incidence of costs: (a) all costs are borne by U.S. meat producers; (b) the costs are equally 
divided between U.S. meat producers and retailers; (c) one-fourth of the costs are borne by U.S. 
meat producers and three-fourths of the costs are borne by retailers; and (d) all costs are borne by 
retailers. The farm and retail supply shifters are entered as negative numbers in the farm supply 
equation [equation (2)] and the retail supply equation [equation (5)] to represent added costs to 
the system. 
Following Lusk and Anderson (2004), on the demand side, three scenarios of increases in 
demand for both U.S. beef and pork in the U.S. domestic market are examined: (a) no demand 
increase; (b) 2% increases in demand for beef and pork; and (c) 5% increases in demand for beef 
and pork. The demand shifters are entered as a positive number in the retail demand equation 
[equation (1)] to represent consumer willingness to pay for the initial quantity of meat due to the 
new labeling policy. The model is simulated by simultaneously shifting the supply and demand 
curves for beef and pork using 2002 average prices and quantities under both competitive 
markets and some degree of retailer oligopsony market power, i.e.  03 . 0 = θ . 
Methods of Simulating Japanese and South Korean Bans on U.S. Beef 
 
The model described above is used to simulate the welfare impacts of the Japanese and South 
Korean bans on U.S. beef. The Japanese and South Korean bans on U.S. beef are imposed by 
shifting the Japanese and South Korean demands for U.S. beef so that the change in quantity 
demanded for U.S. beef in Japan and South Korea decreases by 100 percent. 
Using Excel solver, percentage decreases in demand for U.S. beef in Japan and South 
Korea that yield a 100-percent decrease in the percentage change of quantity demanded of U.S. 
beef in Japan and South Korea are estimated. The solver results indicate that to have a ban on   13 
U.S. beef in Japan and South Korea, the demands for U.S. beef in Japan and South Korea should 
decrease by 466 percent and 825 percent, respectively. Therefore, the Japanese and South 
Korean bans on U.S. beef are simulated by shifting the equations of the Japanese and South 
Korean demands for U.S. beef [equation (1)] by 466 percent and 825 percent, respectively. Three 
ban alternatives are examined: (a) the Japanese ban on U.S. beef; (b) the South Korean ban on 
U.S. beef; and (c) both the Japanese and South Korean bans on U.S. beef. The model is 
simulated using 2002 average prices and quantities. 
Results 
The equilibrium displacement model is used to estimate the welfare impacts of selected supply 
and demand shocks. Specifically, the welfare impacts of beef and pork promotions, COOL, and 
Japanese and South Korean bans on U.S. beef are presented. 
Welfare Impacts of Beef and Pork Promotions 
The estimated welfare impacts of beef and pork promotions are presented in table 2. The results 
show that beef and pork promotions increase producer surplus for producers and marketers of 
U.S. beef and pork and decrease producer surplus for producers and marketers of U.S. poultry 
(table 2, scenario I). Wohlgenant (1993) also reports a positive impact of beef and pork 
promotions on U.S. beef and pork producers. 
Moreover, the results indicate that although pork has a larger supply decrease ( % 4 . 0 = γ ) 
and a lower demand increase ( % 5 . 4 = w ) than beef ( % 2 . 0 = γ and  % 7 . 5 = w ), producers and 
marketers of U.S. pork benefit more from beef and pork promotions than producers and 
marketers of U.S. beef (table 2, scenario I). Economic theory suggests that under a demand 
increase (such as a demand increase due to promotion), the change in producer surplus is high if 
the own-price supply elasticity is less than the absolute value of the respective own-price demand   14 
elasticity. Therefore, a difference in the magnitude of own-price supply and demand elasticities 
of U.S. beef and pork may explain the results. Following Wohlgenant (1993), the model is 
simulated using lower values of U.S. beef and pork own-price supply elasticities than the 
respective own-price demand elasticities. The results, which are presented in table 2 (scenario 
II), show that similar to Wohlgenant (1993), producer and marketers of U.S. beef gain more from 
promotion than producers and marketers of U.S. pork. 
The magnitudes of the estimated impact of beef and pork promotions on U.S. beef and 
pork producers reported in table 2 are lower than those reported by Wohlgenant (1993). The 
difference might be due to the additional 10-percent reduction in the production costs of U.S. 
beef and pork assumed in Wohlgenant’s (1993) study. Therefore, the model is simulated 
assuming also a 10-percent decrease in the production costs for beef and pork. The results show 
$1.84 billion and $0.94 billion as a change in the producer surplus of U.S. beef and pork 
producers, respectively. These results are higher than $1.58 billion and $0.28 billion of change in 
producer surplus of U.S. beef and pork producers reported by Wohlgenant (1993). Hence, these 
results show that as economic theory predicts, adding export promotion increases the change in 
producer surplus of U.S. beef and pork producers. 
Finally, consistent with economic theory, the results show that retailer oligopsony market 
power reduces the welfare of U.S. meat producers and increase the welfare of retailers of U.S. 
meats (table 2, scenario II). For example, the change in farmers’ producer surplus for the overall 
meat industry decreases from $1,122.92 million in a competitive market to $1,079.38 million 
under retailer oligopsony market power; while the change in U.S. retailers’ producer surplus 
increases from $1,090.10 million in a competitive market to $1,113.31 million under retailer 
oligopsony market power (table 2, scenario II). The retailer oligopsony market power seems to   15 
affect the allocation of gains from beef and pork promotions. More importantly, retailer 
oligopsony market power seems to be more likely to decrease the total welfare of the U.S. meat 
industry. For instance, the total meat industry producer surplus (the sum of producer surplus in 
the meat industry) decreases from $2,295.71 under a competitive scenario to $2,277.35 under 
retailer oligopsony market power (table 2, scenario II). 
Welfare Impacts of COOL 
This section discusses the major results of impacts of COOL on U.S. meat producers and 
compares the results with those reported by Lusk and Anderson (2004). The estimated impacts of 
COOL on U.S. meat producers under the assumption of no-demand change are presented in 
table 3. The results indicate that implementation of COOL decreases producer surplus of U.S. 
beef and pork producers and increases producer surplus of U.S. poultry producers regardless of 
who pays for the costs of COOL. U.S. beef and pork producers lose from COOL implementation 
when they pay all the costs of COOL because beef and pork demands must increase to make the 
producer surplus neutral (Lusk and Anderson 2004). In addition, U.S. beef and pork producers 
lose from COOL when all COOL costs are borne by retailers. This result is because the absolute 
value of the own-price demand elasticities for beef and pork are greater than the elasticity of 
substitution between farm product and market input (fixed proportion technology) (Lusk and 
Anderson 2004). Poultry producers gain from COOL because COOL does not add additional 
costs to producing poultry and consequently consumers substitute away from relatively more 
expensive beef and pork to less expensive poultry. 
Similar to Lusk and Anderson (2004), the results of this study show that producer surplus 
of U.S. beef and pork producers increases when COOL costs are increasingly borne by retailers. 
Different from Lusk and Anderson (2004), the results of this study also show that when COOL   16 
costs are increasingly borne by retailers, producer surplus of U.S. poultry producers decreases. 
This result is not because retail COOL costs decrease the retail supply of poultry per se, but 
because of the complementary relationships between U.S. poultry and other meat products 
covered by COOL. The model is simulated using only positive cross-price elasticities between 
U.S. poultry and other meat products covered by COOL. The results, which are presented in 
table 3 (scenario II) indicate that similar to beef and pork, poultry producers are better off when 
COOL costs are increasingly borne by retailers. 
Furthermore, the results presented in table 3 (scenario I) show that retailer oligopsony 
market power decreases the producer surplus of U.S. beef and pork producers. However, 
different from what is expected from economic theory, results presented in table 3 (scenario I) 
also show that poultry producers gain from retailer oligopsony market power. This result does 
not mean that retailer oligopsony market power benefits poultry producers per se; but the 
difference in own-price supply and demand elasticities might explain the unexpected result. A 
one-sector model (a model, which ignores substitutability between meats at retail level and 
international trade) is used to examine the change in producer surplus when there is retailer 


















where  i PS   is the change in producer surplus of meat i,  i η is the own-price demand elasticity of 
meat i,  i ν  is the retail supply shifter for meat i, i ε is the own-price supply elasticity of meat i, 
i δ is the farm share of retail dollar for meat i, i θ is the retailer oligopsony market power 
parameter for meat i,  i γ is the farm supply shifter of meat i, and  i ϖ is retail demand shifter of 
meat i.    17 
  According to equation (10), a change in producer surplus depends on own-price demand 
and supply elasticities, retail and farm supply shifters, a retail demand shifter, a retailer 
oligopsony market power parameter, and a farm share of the retail dollar. Examining the 
denominator of equation (10), the observation is that if the own-price demand elasticity is lower 
(in absolute value) than the own-price supply elasticity, the change in producer surplus should 
tend to increase. Therefore, poultry producers might be gaining from retailer oligopsony market 
power because the own-price supply elasticity of U.S. poultry is higher than the respective 
absolute value of own-price demand elasticity. The model is simulated with greater (in absolute 
value) own-price demand elasticity for U.S. poultry than the respective own-price supply 
elasticity. Estimated results, which are presented in table 3, scenario III, indicate that consistent 
with economic theory, producer surplus of U.S. poultry producers decreases when retailers have 
oligopsony market power.
 
Finally, the assumptions related to a demand increase clearly affect the estimated welfare 
impacts (table 4). If the demands for beef and pork increase by at least two percent, poultry 
producers do not benefit from COOL (table 4). Poultry producers lose when beef and pork 
demands increase by at least two percent because consumers will increase their demand for beef 
and pork products and consequently negatively affect the demand for poultry. Although a two 
percent increase in the demand for beef and pork increases the producer surplus of U.S. pork 
producers, it does not increase the producer surplus of U.S. beef producers (table 4). Pork 
producers benefit and beef producers lose when a two percent increase in beef and pork demands 
occurs because COOL costs for pork are relatively lower than COOL costs for beef. However, if 
beef and pork demands increase by five percent, both beef and pork producers benefit from 
COOL (table 4).   18 
The results obtained in this study are similar to results reported by Lusk and Anderson 
(2004). Both studies find that under no-demand increase, poultry producers benefit from COOL 
while beef and pork producers lose from COOL. Moreover, both studies find that if the demands 
for beef and pork increase by five percent, beef and pork producers benefit from COOL while 
poultry producers lose from COOL. However, some results obtained in this study are different 
from those reported by Lusk and Anderson (2004). This study finds that under no-demand 
increase, beef and pork producers lose from COOL regardless of who pays the costs of COOL. 
However, Lusk and Anderson (2004) report that under no-demand increase, 50/50 and 25/75 cost 
shares between U.S. meat producers and marketers increase the producer surplus of U.S. pork 
and beef producers. A difference in the elasticity of substitutions between market input and farm 
product used in the two studies explains the difference in the results. 
More importantly, different from results reported by Lusk and Anderson (2004), this 
study finds that meat producers as a whole lose from the implementation of COOL even under 
two and five percent increases in demands for beef and pork (table 4). A difference in the 
magnitude between own-price supply and demand elasticities may explain the differences in the 
results. Different from this study, Lusk and Anderson (2004) used a model in which own-price 
supply elasticities of U.S. beef and pork are lower compared to the respective absolute value of 
own-price demand elasticities. Following Lusk and Anderson (2004), the model is simulated 
using relatively low own-price supply elasticities for beef and pork compared to the respective 
absolute values of own-price demand elasticities. The results, which are presented in table 5, 
indicate that similar to results reported by Lusk and Anderson (2004), two and five percent 
increases in demands for beef and pork benefits U.S. beef and pork producers and the whole U.S. 
meat industry.   19 
The results of this study also show that under no-demand increase and all COOL cost 
being paid by producers, the negative impacts of COOL on U.S. beef and pork producers are 
largely lower compared to results reported by Lusk and Anderson (2004). Lusk and Anderson 
(2004) also found a lower negative impact of COOL on beef and pork producers under a model 
with U.S. meat imports compared to a model without trade. Therefore, these results suggest that 
models without trade might overestimate the negative impacts of COOL on U.S. beef and pork 
producers. 
Welfare Implications of the Japanese and South Korean Bans on U.S. beef  
As an extension from previous models, the model developed in this study is able to estimate the 
welfare impacts of animal disease-driven bans on meat from a specific source of origin. Table 6 
presents the results of welfare impacts of Japanese and South Korean bans of U.S. beef on 
producers and marketers of U.S., Australian, Japanese, and South Korean beef. Concerning the 
Japanese ban on U.S. beef, the results show that the ban decreases the producer surplus of 
producers and marketers of U.S. beef and increases producer surplus of producers and marketers 
of Australian and Japanese beef (table 6 scenario, I). 
The producer surplus of producers and marketers of U.S. beef decreases because as the 
major U.S. beef importer stops importing U.S. beef, the quantities of U.S. beef available in the 
U.S. domestic market and in other U.S. export markets increase. The increase in quantities of 
U.S. beef will tend to decrease the U.S. beef price, which leads to a decrease in producer surplus 
of producers and marketers of U.S. beef. The producer surplus of producers and marketers of 
Japanese and Australian beef increases because the shares of beef from these sources in the 
Japanese market increase as Japanese consumers substitute the non-existent U.S. beef with 
Japanese and Australian beef.   20 
Regarding the South Korean ban on U.S. beef, the results show that the ban decreases 
producer surplus of U.S., Australian, and South Korean beef farmers (table 6 scenario, I). The 
reduction of producer surplus of Australian and South Korean beef farmers is an unexpected 
result. Complementary relationships between U.S. beef and Australian beef in the South Korean 
meat market might explain the result. Therefore, the cross-price elasticities between U.S. beef 
and Australian beef (-0.123 and -0.253) are changed to positive values (substitution relationship). 
The model is simulated and the results are presented in table 6, scenario II. The results indicate 
that similar to the Japanese ban on U.S. beef, the South Korean ban on U.S. beef decreases 
producer surplus of producers and marketers of U.S. beef and increases producer surplus of 
producers and marketers of Australian and South Korean beef. Finally, the results indicate that 
when both Japan and South Korea ban U.S. beef, producers and marketers of U.S. beef lose more 
while the producers and marketers of Australian, Japanese, and South Korean beef gain more 
compared to single ban (table 6 scenario, II). 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
This research is motivated by the lack of comprehensive partial equilibrium models, which can 
explain the impacts of demand and supply shocks on U.S. meat prices, quantities, and industry 
welfare. Previous models did not include the U.S. meat trade (imports and exports) with meats 
differentiated by supply source. Hence, those models were not able to evaluate the effects of U.S. 
non-price export promotion programs and trade barriers such as the disease driven international 
bans on U.S. beef. Different from past studies, this study builds an equilibrium displacement 
model, which includes U.S. produced meats, U.S. meat imports from major partners, and U.S. 
meat exports to major partners with meats differentiated by source of origin. More importantly, 
the model is flexible since it can simulate welfare impacts of supply and demand shocks,   21 
assuming either perfect or imperfect competition in the middle stage (processor-retailer) of the 
meat supply chain. The results indicate that the effectiveness of beef and pork promotion as well 
as the impacts of COOL vary according to the model used. The results indicate that while the 
benefits from beef and pork promotions are higher, the negative impacts of COOL are lower 
under a model with international trade than in a model without trade. More importantly, the 
model developed in this study is unique since it can estimate the welfare impacts of disease-
driven international meat bans on meat producers and marketers. 
Specially, as previously reported by Wohlgenant (1993) and others, this study finds that 
beef and pork promotions benefit U.S. meat industry, especially for producers and marketers of 
U.S. beef. More importantly, this study finds that beef and pork export promotions increase the 
positive impact of beef and pork promotions on the welfare of U.S. beef and pork producers. 
Consistent with economic theory, retailer oligopsony market power increases producer surplus of 
marketers of U.S. meats and decreases producer surplus of producers of U.S. meats. Similar to 
studies by Lusk and Anderson (2004) and Brester, Marsh, and Atwood (2004), implementation 
of COOL will not benefit the U.S. meat industry unless the implementation is accompanied by 
an increase in meat demand. Differentiating meats by source of origin and including both U.S. 
meat exports and imports decreases the negative impact of COOL on U.S. meat producers. For 
the Japanese and South Korean bans on U.S. beef, the conclusion is that consistent with 
economic theory, the Japanese and South Korean bans on U.S. beef reduce the welfare of 
producers and marketers of U.S. beef and increase the welfare of producers and marketers of 
other competing beef products. Finally, the results show that the negative impact of banning U.S. 
beef is greater under multiple bans (Japanese and South Korean bans) compared to a single ban.   22 
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Table 1. COOL Supply Shifters for Different Meat Products 
 
Meat Product  Share
1  meat type shifter  meat product shifter 
All Costs Borne by Producers (Farm level)       
U.S. fed beef  0.85  0.03  0.02550 
U.S. nonfed beef  0.15  0.03  0.00450 
U.S. Pork  1  0.01  0.01000 
All Costs Borne by Marketers (Retail level)       
U.S. fed beef  0.776  0.017  0.01342 
U.S. nonfed beef  0.137  0.017  0.00237 
Beef from  Australia  0.031  0.017  0.00053 
Beef from Canada  0.032  0.017  0.00055 
Beef  from New Zealand  0.016  0.017  0.00028 
Beef from the ROW  0.008  0.017  0.00014 
Pork from the U.S.  0.947  0.004  0.00338 
Pork from Canada  0.044  0.004  0.00016 
Pork from the ROW  0.008  0.004  0.00003 
Cost Share by Domestic Producers and Marketers (50/50)     
Producers (Farm Level)       
U.S. fed beef  0.85  0.015  0.01275 
U.S. nonfed beef  0.15  0.015  0.00225 
U.S. Pork  1  0.005  0.005 
Marketers (Retail level)       
U.S. fed beef  0.776  0.009  0.00671 
U.S. nonfed beef  0.137  0.009  0.00118 
Beef from  Australia  0.031  0.009  0.00027 
Beef from Canada  0.032  0.009  0.00027 
Beef  from New Zealand  0.016  0.009  0.00014 
Beef from the ROW  0.008  0.009  0.00007 
Pork from the U.S.  0.947  0.002  0.00169 
Pork from Canada  0.044  0.002  0.00008 
Pork from the ROW  0.008  0.002  0.00002 
Cost Share by Domestic Producers and Marketers (25/75)     
Producers (Farm Level)       
U.S. fed beef  0.85  0.0075  0.006375 
U.S. nonfed beef  0.15  0.0075  0.001125 
U.S. Pork  1  0.0025  0.0025 
Marketers (Retail level)       
U.S. fed beef  0.776  0.01297  0.01006 
U.S. nonfed beef  0.137  0.01297  0.00178 
Beef from  Australia  0.031  0.01297  0.00040 
Beef from Canada  0.032  0.01297  0.00041 
Beef  from New Zealand  0.016  0.01297  0.00021 
Beef from the ROW  0.008  0.01297  0.00011 
Pork from the U.S.  0.947  0.00268  0.00254 
Pork from Canada  0.044  0.00268  0.00012 
Pork from the ROW  0.008  0.00268  0.00002 
1 Refers to the share of each meat product in the U.S. domestic market.     
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Table 2. Results of Welfare Impacts of Beef and Pork Promotions ($ millions) 
 
Description  Beef  Pork  Poultry  Meat 
Industry  
Scenario I         
Perfectly competitive market         
Change in producer surplus at farm level in the U.S.   270.09  342.59  -493.66  119.02 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in the U.S.  265.79  340.74  -420.44  186.09 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in Canada  2.16  2.36  -3.38  1.14 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in Japan  6.56  10.83  -1.50  15.90 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in Mexico  8.30  8.48  -11.37  5.41 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in South Korea  5.78  0.62  -2.02  4.38 
Total  558.68  705.62  -932.37  331.94 
Retailer oligopsony Market Power (θ=0.03)         
Change in producer surplus at farm level in the U.S.   265.68  343.00  -503.92  104.76 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in the U.S.  275.12  366.69  -448.95  192.86 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in Canada  2.24  2.54  -3.61  1.17 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in Japan  6.80  11.66  -1.60  16.86 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in Mexico  8.56  9.14  -12.15  5.56 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in South Korea  6.00  0.66  -2.15  4.51 
Total  564.40  733.69  -972.38  325.72 
Scenario II         
Perfectly competitive market         
Change in producer surplus at farm level in the U.S.   877.61  501.49  -256.17  1,122.92 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in the U.S.  821.27  487.46  -218.63  1,090.10 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in Canada  5.66  3.35  -1.72  7.29 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in Japan  17.48  15.36  -0.77  32.07 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in Mexico  21.99  11.92  -5.79  28.12 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in South Korea  15.36  0.88  -1.03  15.21 
Total  1,759.37  1,020.46  -484.11  2,295.71 
Retailer oligopsony Market Power (θ=0.03)         
Change in producer surplus at farm level in the U.S.   854.86  482.92  -258.39  1,079.38 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in the U.S.  838.41  505.60  -230.70  1,113.31 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in Canada  5.79  3.48  -1.82  7.45 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in Japan  17.86  15.94  -0.81  33.00 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in Mexico  22.42  12.37  -6.11  28.68 
Change in producer surplus at retail level in South Korea  15.71  0.91  -1.08  15.53 
Total  1,755.05  1,021.22  -498.91  2,277.35 
Notes: Scenario I uses the base model parameter values. Under Scenario II, the own-price demand elasticity for 
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All Costs Borne 
by Domestic 
Producers 
Cost Shared by Domestic 




      50/50    25/75     
Scenario I               
No Demand Change               
Perfectly competitive market               
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  -90.75    -75.73    -68.21    -60.69 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  -35.67    -32.68    -31.18    -29.69 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  76.29    73.81    72.57    71.34 
Retailer Oligopsony Power (θ=0.03)               
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  -94.02    -76.85    -68.26    -59.66 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  -37.53    -33.66    -31.72    -29.78 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  79.57    75.86    74.00    72.14 
Scenario II               
No Demand Change               
Perfectly competitive market               
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  -89.40    -74.17    -66.55    -58.93 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  -37.62    -34.92    -33.57    -32.22 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  124.66    129.42    131.80    134.18 
Retailer Oligopsony Market Power (θ=0.03)               
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  -92.54    -75.21    -66.54    -57.86 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  -39.60    -35.95    -34.12    -32.30 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  128.83    130.47    131.29    132.11 
Scenario III               
 No Demand Change               
Perfectly competitive market                
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  -88.84    -73.59    -65.96    -58.33 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  -38.42    -35.76    -34.42    -33.09 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  144.21    149.70    152.44    155.19 
Retailer Oligopsony Market Power (θ=0.03)               
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  -92.48    -75.15    -66.48    -57.81 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  -40.28    -36.64    -34.82    -33.00 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  142.43    144.24    145.14    146.05 
Notes: Scenario I uses the base model parameter values. Under scenario II, the negative values of cross-price 
elasticities between U.S. poultry and U.S. pork; U.S. poultry and Canadian pork; and U.S. poultry and ROW pork 
in the U.S. domestic market are changed from their original values of -0.648, -0.887, and -0.892, respectively to 
1.648, 1.88, and 1.892, respectively. Under scenario III, in addition to scenario II, the own-price U.S. poultry 
supply elasticity is changed from 0.65 to 0.3, and the own-price U.S. poultry demand elasticity is changed from 
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Table 4. Results of Welfare Impacts of COOL ($ millions) 
 
Cost Shared by Domestic 



















Two Percent Demand Increase for Beef and Pork               
Perfectly competitive market                
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  -44.36    -29.31    -21.78    -14.24 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  50.69    53.69    55.20    56.70 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  -53.06    -55.51    -56.74    -57.96 
Total  -46.73    -31.13    -23.32    -15.50 
Retailer Oligopsony Power (θ=0.03)               
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  -48.45    -31.24    -22.64    -14.03 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  47.70    51.60    53.55    55.50 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  -51.48    -55.16    -57.00    -58.84 
Total  -52.23    -34.80    -26.09    -17.37 
Five Percent Demand Increase for Beef and Pork               
Perfectly competitive market               
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  25.38    40.48    48.03    55.59 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  181.04    184.06    185.58    187.09 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  -244.55    -246.97    -248.17    -249.38 
Total  -38.13    -22.43    -14.56    -6.70 
Retailer Oligopsony Power (θ=0.03)               
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  20.07    37.32    45.95    54.58 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  176.35    180.27    182.24    184.20 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  -245.47    -249.09    -250.90    -252.71 
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Cost Shared by Domestic 
Producers and Marketers 
All Costs Borne 
by Marketers 
       
50/50 
   
25/75 
   
No Demand Change                
Perfectly competitive market               
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  -218.58    -201.40    -192.81    -184.21 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  -40.99    -39.09    -38.13    -37.18 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  32.32    31.16    30.58    30.00 
Total  -227.25    -209.33    -200.36    -191.39 
Two Percent Demand Increase for Beef and 
Pork 
             
Perfectly competitive market                
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  58.92    76.26    84.94    93.62 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  155.55    157.48    158.45    159.41 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  -23.39    -24.55    -25.12    -25.70 
Total  191.08    209.19    218.27    227.33 
Five Percent Demand Increase for Beef and 
Pork 
             
Perfectly competitive market               
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  480.89    498.47    507.27    516.08 
Change in U.S. pork producer surplus  454.57    456.53    457.51    458.49 
Change in U.S. poultry producer surplus  -106.48    -107.63    -108.21    -108.78 
Total  828.98    847.37    856.57    865.79 
Note: The own-price demand elasticities for U.S. fed beef, U.S. nonfed beef, U.S. pork, and U.S. poultry are 
changed from -0.357, -0.170, -0.207, and -0.005 to -1.357, -2.178, -1.207, and -0.33, respectively. 
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Table 6. Results of Welfare Impacts of Japanese and South Korean Bans on U.S. Beef 

















  Producer 
Surplus 
  Producer 
Surplus 
Scenario I           
Farm Level           
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus  -220.62    -375.71    -593.12 
Change in Australian beef producer surplus  196.10    -183.95    -2.51 
Change in Japanese beef producer surplus  2,703.82        2767.79 
Change in South Korean beef producer surplus      -18.25    27.33 
Retail Level           
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus in the U.S.  -199.23    -340.74    -541.52 
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus in Canada  -1.48    -2.60    -4.05 
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus in Japan  -2.37    -8.73    -6.39 
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus in Mexico  -6.78    -9.74    -17.71 
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus in South Korea  -4.29    -3.59    -5.92 
Change in Australian beef producer surplus in Japan  25.99        -0.35 
Change in Australian beef producer surplus in S. Korea      0.07    0.002 
Change in Japanese beef producer surplus in Japan  2,704.68        2,768.67 
Change in producer surplus of South Korean beef       -18.25    27.34 
Scenario II           
Farm Level           
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus   -217.03    -351.23    -565.31 
Change in Australian beef producer surplus  195.79    204.77    415.62 
Change in Japanese beef producer surplus  2,703.79        2,681.93 
Change in South Korean beef producer surplus      14.45    60.59 
Retailer Level           
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus in the U.S.  -195.97    -317.84    -514.96 
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus in Canada  -1.46    -2.42    -3.84 
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus in Japan  -2.33    -7.60    -6.17 
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus in Mexico  -6.67    -9.74    -17.91 
Change in U.S. beef producer surplus in South Korea  -4.24    -3.38    -5.73 
Change in Australian beef producer surplus in Japan  25.96        52.84 
Change in Australian beef producer surplus in S. Korea      16.48    32.14 
Change in Japanese beef producer surplus in Japan  2,704.65        2,682.79 
Change in producer surplus of South Korean beef       14.45    60.59 
Notes: Scenario I uses the base model parameters. Under scenario II, cross-price elasticities between U.S. beef and 
Australian beef and between Australian and U.S. beef are 0.123 and 0.253, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 